Cartesian Values and the Critical Thinking Movement: Challenges for the Christian Scholar and Teacher * Forrest E. Baird * Professor of Philosophy Whitworth College * Dale E. Soden * Associate Professor of History Whitworth College In recent years there has been a tremendous surge of interest in the field of critical thinking. Courses in critical thinking have been added to curriculums from high school through graduate school. A booming seminar business teaching critical thinking has emerged. Dozens of books have appeared in which authors define critical thinking and offer guidance for teaching it to everyone from kindergartners to corporate executives. The Center for Critical Thinking at Sonoma State University, directed by Richard Paul, hosts international conferences and offers a master's degree in the subject. School districts around the country are developing strategies for the inclusion of critical thinking as one of the primary intellectual goals of education. Proponents boast that critical thinking is one of the most important keys to America's renewed competitiveness. Some even argue that all of American education ought to be redesigned around the concepts of critical thinking. At first glance, critical thinking appears to be a value-neutral educational goal with which no one would 1 disagree. Virtually every academic and public official asserts that our society would benefit if people thought more clearly. Supporters for critical thinking suggest that this mode of thought is simply a method for enabling better analysis. The content being critically examined is completely irrelevant to this method. However, as one penetrates the surface of the critical thinking movement there appear to be underlying values that are too often unstated. And it is our contention that these values are problematic for the Christian scholar and teacher. More specifically, we believe that the movement is plagued by a Cartesian approach to epistemology (the question of how we know) and, as a result, the methods of critical thinking being promoted reflect the weaknesses associated with Descartes. In this paper we examine the Cartesian paradigm- its historical roots and basic characteristics-and show how the critical thinking movement as it is being promulgated today is based on this paradigm. Our effort is to identify the values and assumptions embedded within the critical thinking movement. From a Christian perspective we raise several questions regarding the implications of these values for those who are in faith communities centered on belief in the Scriptures. And finally we ask how critical thinking skills should be taught in a Christian college. I. The Cartesian Paradigm During the Renaissance there was a movement away from the metaphysical speculations of the Middle Ages to an 2 emphasis on epistemology. With science developing at a rapid rate, philosophical speculation moved from questions of being to questions of knowing. Without question, the leader of this move to epistemology was Rene Descartes (1596-1650). In attempting to find epistemological certainty, Descartes hit upon the idea of using doubt as a tool or a weapon against doubt itself: I ought to reject as downright false all opinions which I could not imagine to be in the least degree open to doubt-my purpose being to discover whether, after doing so, there might not remain, as still calling for belief, something entirely indubitable.1 By methodologically doubting all that he had been taught or thought that he knew, Descartes came to the point where he could not doubt his doubting. This led to his famous "Cogito ergo sum"-"I think, therefore I am."2 But this philosophy of Descartes did much more than give him supposed epistemological certainty. This approach to philosophy led to a paradigm which stresses the discovery of truths which are (1) timeless, (2) certain, (3) foundational, and (4) known by individuals. This Cartesian paradigm is assumed by much of the critical thinking movement today. (1) Timeless-Descartes began his methodological doubt by throwing out all historical truths. All the authority of the history of knowledge, the wisdom of the past, even the accumulated data of past scientific experiments were to be discarded as error-prone. All previous data, 3 . . . built up, as they are, little by little, from the opinions of many different contributors, do not get so near to the truth as the simple reasonings which a man of good sense, making use of his natural powers, can carry out respecting what happens to come before him.3 History, as such, was denigrated. As Richard Bernstein points out, history for Descartes "can get in the way of, and divert us from, the serious project of discovering the foundations and building the edifice of objective knowledge."4 In place of historical truths, Descartes sought timeless, objective truth; truth that was not bound to a particular age or location. (2) Certain-These timeless truths were to be known with certainty, not probability. While historical truths were always subject to revision and re-interpretation, the timeless truths Descartes was seeking would be true regardless of time or place. Descartes had seen a multitude of varying opinions emerge during the Renaissance. He had seen recent discoveries in science, particularly astronomy, come into conflict with the historical truths of the Catholic church. He wanted to find truth which was not subject to re-examination, truth that was 100% certain; beyond suspicion. As Eberhard Jungel points out, this meant that for Descartes, "the question of truth [was] being guided by the question of certainty."5 Descartes had grown so suspicious of the conflicting opinions that had paraded as truth that he was only willing to allow that which could be known with certainty to be called "truth." As he put it: When I, further, considered how many diverse 4 opinions regarding one and the same matter are upheld by learned men, and that only one of all these opinions can be true, I accounted as well-nigh false all that is only probable.6 Clearly, such a standard of truth would end up excluding much. (3) Foundational-These timeless, certain truths Descartes was seeking would be foundational in nature. As Descartes put it in the Meditations, If I am to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences, I must once and for all, and by a deliberate effort, rid myself of all those opinions to which I have hitherto given credence, starting entirely anew, and building from the foundations up.7 The contemporary critic of epistemological foundationalism, Richard Rorty, has pointed out that this emphasis on certainty shows that Descartes conflated the justification of knowledge and the causal explanation of knowledge. Knowledge can be understood as a relation to certain propositions. In that case, justification consists in showing other propositions from which the given knowledge can be inferred. But Descartes seemed to understand knowledge as being some special kind of relationship between propositions and the "objects" those propositions are about. In this case, to justify knowledge, We will want to get behind reasons to causes, beyond argument to compulsion from the object known, to a situation in which . . . anyone gripped by the object in the required way will be unable to doubt or to see an alternative. To reach that point is to reach the foundations of knowledge.8 (4) Known by Individuals-Finally, the quest to find these foundational, certain truths must be carried out by 5 individuals. The whole Cartesian enterprise is a solitary, independent exercise in which the "I" is to find, by self-reflection, the foundationlessness of former beliefs and prejudices.9 As Descartes put it, "My design has all along been limited to the reform of my own thoughts, and to the basing of them on a foundation entirely my own."10 Each thinker is on his or her own; there really is no place for a community of scholars. II. The Cartesian Paradigm and the Critical Thinking Movement This Cartesian paradigm has become a dominant underlying and unnoticed assumption in our contemporary world. It is now difficult for many persons to think in non-Cartesian terms. As Richard Taylor points out, this paradigm has become embedded . . . in our manner of doing natural science, in our technology, in some at least of the dominant ways in which we construe political life (the atomistic ones), . . . in various ways of healing, regimenting, organizing people in society, and in other spheres too numerous to mention. This . . . model [has sunk] to the level of unquestionable background assumption.11 Regarding the timeless nature of truth, critical theorists focus on the importance of eliminating historical or cultural bias. For example, Richard Paul emphasizes the need for the critical thinker to develop insight into "sociocentricity," which he explains as "the assumption that one's own social group is inherently and self-evidently superior to all others."12 Paul hopes the critical thinker 6 can begin to distinguish cultural and historical bias, much as Descartes hoped a careful thinker would. Paul desires that we liberate ourselves from the culturally derived "mental links which, if they remain unexamined, unduly influence our thinking."13 Virtually all of the critical thinking skills listed by various writers are intended to help evaluate and critique historical truth. All of this suggests that critical theorists are most comfortable with a paradigm that places the thinker in the position of transcending time, or moving outside of history. The hope is that a critical thinker might exercise judgment regarding everything from moral values to factual data from a position that is free from historical bias. The search for certain truth drove Descartes and his followers to use methodological doubt or skepticism to come to a point where one could not doubt his/her doubting. The use of methodological doubt or skepticism still wields considerable influence among critical theorists. And while it is fair to say that most practicing critical theorists acknowledge the problems of reaching absolute certainty, nevertheless most use a form of Cartesian skepticism to try and get as close as they can to objective certainty. The goal is to be as certain as is humanly possible. Richard Paul argues that a critical thinker must distinguish "facts from ideals," and must approach phenomena by "suspending judgment." It is that suspension of judgment which allows a critical evaluation of phenomena. "Critical thinking 7 requires sensitivity to the distinction between those facts that are relevant to an issue and those which are not," according to Paul.14 The ability to distinguish "relevant" from "irrelevant" facts implies a position on the part of the thinker that moves one toward believing in a level of certitude. The goal of objective certainty is at least implicit when Harvey Siegel argues that "moral education must seek to develop in the student a willingness and an ability to face moral situations impartially rather than on the basis of self-interest, for adequate moral behavior demands such impartiality."15 "Such 'rational virtues' as impartiality of judgment, ability to view matters from a variety of non-self-interested perspectives, and recognition of the force of reasons, to name just three such virtues, are indispensable to moral education."16 Siegel's hope is that the critical thinker will develop reasons that will confirm the objective validity of a particular position. "One who has the critical attitude . . . is committed to the objective evaluation of relevant evidence; and . . . values such aspects of critical thinking as intellectual honesty, justice to evidence, sympathetic and impartial consideration of interests, objectivity, and impartiality."17 Critical theorists on the whole are deeply committed to a mode of thinking that will bring one closer to certitude, objectivity, and dispassionate analysis. When describing what he means by the term "perfections of thought," Richard 8 Paul asserts that this type of thinking involves "an attempt to understand the world as it is." Thinking in this context "has a natural excellence or fitness to it. This excellence is manifest in its clarity, precision, specificity, accuracy, relevance, consistency, logic, depth, completeness, significance, fairness, and adequacy."18 All of these terms suggest a debt to Descartes and his followers. Regarding the focus on foundational knowledge, Richard Paul has pointed out the need to raise and pursue "root questions." One must "examine assumptions" and recognize contradictions.19 Robert Ennis also found the essence of critical thinking in its pursuit of foundational knowledge. Ennis asserted that one must be able to judge whether "there is ambiguity in a line of reasoning."20 One must judge whether an "inductive conclusion is warranted," and whether a definition is adequate. Ennis's major emphasis is on the relationship between statements. Only carefully specified statements can lead to critically derived knowledge. But it is in their emphasis on the individual that these theorists most clearly show their Cartesian heritage. Following Descartes, Richard Paul, Harvey Siegel, John McPeck and many other contemporary critical theorists insist that one of the key characteristics of critical thinking is independent thinking. "Critical thinking is autonomous thinking, thinking for oneself," wrote Paul. "Many of our beliefs are acquired at an early age, when we have a strong 9 tendency to accept beliefs for irrational reasons (because we want to believe, because we are rewarded for believing). The critical thinker uses critical skills to reveal and eradicate beliefs to which he cannot rationally assent."21 Paul argues that the goal of a critical thinker is to develop "emancipatory reason-skills that generate not only fundamental insight but also some command of one's own cognitive and affective processes. . . . [W]e emphasize comprehensive critical thinking skills essential to the free, rational, and autonomous mind."22 In other words, one must attempt to step outside one's value system and culture in order to evaluate effectively the influence of one's culture on one's values or thought. One must attempt to understand how living in a community or culture has biased one's view of the world. While Paul and others acknowledge that critical thinking is often best accomplished within a Socratic or dialogical context, meaning that there should be an "extended exchange between different points of view or frames of reference,"23 nevertheless the focus on autonomous thinking is embedded throughout the discussion. "Having rational control of one's beliefs, values, and inferences," wrote Paul, is the definition of intellectual autonomy. "The ideal of critical thinking is to learn to think for oneself, to gain command over one's thought processes."24 Empowerment of the self in the context of critical thinking is developed with "extensive practice in independent 10 problem-solving."25 Other critical theorists reinforce the emphasis on what Descartes described as the importance of liberating the "I" from the biases and prejudices of culturally conditioned knowledge. For example, Harvey Siegel suggests that one of the most important justifications for teaching critical thinking is "to render the child self-sufficient; to empower the student to control her destiny and to create her future, not submit to it." The emphasis on the individual cultivating his or her power to determine values is foundational to the critical thinking movement.26 III. The Cartesian Paradigm and Christianity Despite its dominance, increasing numbers of scholars are questioning this paradigm. A recent critique of the Cartesian paradigm and its impact on Western Civilization is found in Christopher Lasch's book The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics. Lasch charges that a new class of intellectuals has emerged in American society. Oriented toward professionalism and a culture of expertise, this class, according to Lasch, has difficulty breaking out of certain intellectual presuppositions. "The truth about the new class," writes Lasch, "if we try to see it from the outside, is that its members, in spite of the diversity of their occupations and their political beliefs, have a common outlook."27 Lasch describes that common outlook as one centering on a culture of critical discourse: 11 They share an inordinate respect for education credentials, a refusal to accept anything on faith, a commitment to free inquiry, a tendency to question authority, a belief in tolerance as the supreme political virtue. At their best, these qualities describe the scientific habit of mind-the willingness to submit every idea, no matter how distasteful or attractive, to critical scrutiny and to suspend judgment until all the relevant evidence can be assessed . . . [but] it can degenerate into a snobbish disdain for people who lack formal education and work with their hands, and unfounded confidence in the moral wisdom of experts, and equally unfounded prejudice against untutored common sense, a distrust of any expression of good intentions, a distrust of everything but science, an ingrained irreverence, a disposition (the natural outgrowth of irreverence and distrust) to see the world as something that exists only to gratify human desires.28 But what is of particular concern for this study is the way in which this paradigm, both as developed by Descartes and as used by contemporary critical thinking theorists, stands in opposition to the historic Christian faith. In fact, at least one version of a Christian epistemology, a Reformed Christian epistemology, would stand in direct contrast to each characteristic of the Cartesian paradigm. The Christian epistemology we would advocate stresses understanding that is (1) historical, (2) probable, (3) systemic, and (4) known by communities. (1) Historical-While the Cartesian paradigm stresses the timeless quality of truth, the Christian faith stresses the historical nature of the revelation of that truth. While Christians clearly believe in a Universal Truth that is timeless, our knowledge of that truth is dependent on the historical revelation of God. As philosopher David Wolfe puts it, 12 The religious believer is one who discerns the presence and action of God in the processes of nature ("The heavens are telling the glory of God" [Psa. 19:1]) and the events of history ("And he made from one every nation of men to live on all the face of the earth, having determined allotted periods and boundaries of their habitation" [Acts 17:26]), as well as in his own life.29 The fact is that despite his desire for timeless truths, Descartes himself was bound to the history of the Renaissance. The "intuitions" which seemed so timelessly obvious to Descartes are, in fact, historically based and can be replaced by other "intuitions."30 (2) Probable-Rather than search for an unattainable certainty, our epistemology recognizes the probable nature of human truth. Descartes' emphasis on certainty denies the limitedness, finitude, and sinfulness of human reason which a Reformed Christian epistemology would uphold. While as Christians we believe that there is a Universal Truth that is timeless, certain, and foundational, the condition of sin limits our access to that Ultimate Truth. But beyond this denial of human finitude and fallenness, the Cartesian emphasis on doubt as a means to find certainty has some troubling implications for our concept of God. In Descartes' system, God is in the odd position of being doubted yet also being the guarantor against doubt. During the process of methodological doubt, Descartes conjures up an "evil genius" who causes him to doubt both the existence of God and the apparent truths of logic and mathematics. Yet it turns out to be God who allows him to "reinstate" mathematics and logic, and to cast 13 the evil genius from his mind. But Descartes' use of doubt goes much deeper than this odd turnaround. As theologian Eberhard Jungel points out: The fact that I am, that I am a 'thinking thing' (res cogitans), that I discover myself as existent with the idea of God, all had to be secured through my doubt. Without 'doubting' (dubitare) there is no 'I think-I am' (cogito sum), there is no certainty of a 'thinking thing' (modi cogitationis) and thus no 'ideas,' including no idea of God! Without an idea of God there is no proof of God, and without a proof of God there is no certainty of God. Doubt, then, is a necessary condition for having certainty of God. This means that atheism, or at least a "methodological will to atheism," is essential to knowing God and finding certainty. (3) Systemic Understanding-While Descartes emphasized the need to find the foundations of knowledge, many Christian thinkers would claim that this is hopeless. As philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff says, On all fronts foundationalism is in bad shape. It seems to me that there is nothing to do but give it up for mortally ill and learn to live in its absence. Theorizing is without a foundation of indubitables.31 Rather than attempting to find foundational propositions that are "more true," our epistemology looks for coherence in the overall system of beliefs. The criterion for truth is not the correspondence to some foundational proposition, but the connection to other accepted beliefs. Wolfe describes this system of beliefs in terms of a "project" to which one commits oneself. This system of beliefs, or "project," already contains the criteria by which one can 14 judge the coherence of the "project": If you have a project, then you have criteria as a result. Criteria are . . . simply a clarification of the project we or someone else sets for us. In such cases the criteria are not arbitrary with respect to the given project, they are the project.32 In other words, there is not some foundational belief to which one can compare other beliefs. Instead, a system of beliefs must be understood as a whole and judged accordingly. Wolterstorff makes this plain when he states, In weighing a theory one always brings along the whole complex of one's beliefs. One does not strip away all but those beliefs functioning as data relative to the theory being weighed. On the contrary, one remains cloaked in belief-aware of some strands, unaware of most.33 If, as we believe, Wolterstorff is correct, the critical theorists' emphasis on eliminating cultural and historical "bias" is impossible. (4) Known by Communities-Unlike the Cartesian emphasis on the solitary, individual knower, our Christian paradigm emphasizes the community of knowers. A community is characterized in part by its language, its assumptions and its shared beliefs. These characteristics shape the nature of what counts as truth and how it is known. Instead of the lonely individual seeking to find truth through self-reflection (or through individual sensations), our Christian epistemology emphasizes the role of the community. It is the community that distinguishes the relevant from the superfluous, the important from the mundane. It is the community that decides what is meaningful and what is not. 15 As Jerry Gill notes, The participatory aspect of religious knowing is not individualistic in nature. Rather, it takes place within a historic and contemporary community . . . . It is within and by means of the current community that religious knowing is awakened, explored, and confirmed.34 IV. CONCLUSION All of this is to suggest that there are important reasons for revisiting the way we teach "critical thinking." Is a Cartesian emphasis on timeless truths consistent with a faith based on an historical text like the Bible? Is a desire for certainty consistent with a belief in the sinfulness of human beings? Are there really foundational propositions which can form the basis of thinking? Should our emphasis in the classroom be on developing autonomous learners apart from community? It is this last question that particularly troubles us. We believe that knowing and thinking are best done in communities, not in isolation. For too long the practice of teaching has focused on separating the student from others and convincing the learner that the community is unnecessary and even detrimental to the pursuit of truth. It is our hope that faculty who take seriously the challenge to integrate faith and learning will re-examine their use of critical thinking in the classroom. References 1René Descartes, Discourse on Method, in Descartes' Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (NY: Random House, 1958), p.118. 16 2Ibid., p. 119. 3Ibid., p. 102. 4Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 118. For further discussion of the implications of this disposing of history see Eberhard Jungel, God as the Mystery of the World, trans. by Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans, 1983), p. 113 and Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 47. 5Jungel, God as the Mystery of the World, p. 112. 6Ibid., p. 98. 7Meditations on First Philosophy, in Descartes' Philosophical Writings, op. cit., p. 176. 8Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 159. 9See Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p. 116. 10Descartes, op. cit., p. 104. 11Taylor, "Philosophy and its History," in Rorty, op. cit., p. 20-21. As Taylor goes on to point out: "One has an ironic sense of how things have changed, when one reads Descartes advising his readers to ponder the Meditations seriously, and even to spend a month thinking about the first one, so difficult did it seem to him to break the previous mind-set and grasp the dualist truth. Today, philosophers of my persuasion spend years trying to get students (and decades trying to get colleagues) to see that there is an alternative." 12R. W. Paul, Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World (Rohnert Park, CA: Sonoma State University Press, 1990), p. 568. 13Ibid., p. 546. 14Richard Paul, A. J. A. Binker, and Marla Charbonneau, Critical Thinking Handbook, K-3: A Guide to Remodelling Lesson Plans in Language Arts, Social Studies, and Science (Rohnert Park, CA: Sonoma State University Press, 1986), p. 39. 15Harvey Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education (NY: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1988), p. 43. 16Harvey Siegel, Educating Reason, p. 43. 17Ibid., p. 39. 18R. W. Paul, Critical Thinking, p. 563. 19R. W. Paul, Ibid., pp. 87-106. 20R. H. Ennis, "A Concept of Critical Thinking," Harvard Educational Review 32 (1962): 86. 21Richard Paul, A. J. A. Binker, and Marla Charbonneau, Critical Thinking Handbook: K-3. A Guide to Remodelling Lesson Plans in Language Arts, Social Studies, and Science (Rohnert Park, CA: Sonoma State University Press, 1986), p. 28; major works on critical thinking include Richard Paul, Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World (Rohnert Park, CA: Sonoma State 17 University Press, 1990); Harvey Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, & Education (NY: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1988); Edward M. Glaser, An Experiment in the Development of Critical Thinking (NY: Columbia University Press, 1941); R. H. Ennis, "A Concept of Critical Thinking," Harvard Educational Review 32 (1962): 81-111; J. E. McPeck, Critical Thinking and Education (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1981). 22R. W. Paul, "Critical Thinking: Fundamental to Educational for a Free Society," Educational Leadership (September 1984), p. 5. 23R. W. Paul, Critical Thinking, p. 547. 24R. W. Paul, Ibid., p. 553. 25R. W. Paul, Ibid., p. 565. 26See Harvey Siegel, Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education (NY: Routledge, 1988), pp. 57-62; see M. S. Katz, "Critical Literacy: A Conception of Education as a Moral Right and a Social Ideal," in R. B. Everhart, ed., The Public School Monopoly: A Critical Analysis of Education and the State in American Society (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982), pp. 193-223; I. Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (NY: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973 [first published in 1973 by Routledge & Kegan Paul], pp. 123-5; R. H. Ennis, "A Concept of Critical Thinking," Harvard Educational Review 32 (1962): 81-111. 27Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (NY: Norton, 1991), p. 527. 28Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven, p. 527. 29David L. Wolfe, Epistemology: The Justification of Belief (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1982), p. 73. 30Cf., Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 31Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason Within the Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976), p. 52. 32Wolfe, op. cit., p. 46. 33Wolterstorff, op. cit., pp. 62-63. 34Jerry H. Gill, On Knowing God, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981), p. 146. 18