CREATION, ETHICS, AND EDUCATION + Michael L. Peterson + Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Department Asbury College The Christian doctrine of creation is a rich and suggestive resource for Christian educators who face the challenge of how to cultivate ethical values and foster ethical behavior in students. To be sure, Christian educators must be concerned with the relevance of the redemptional themes of the New Testament to the ethical lives of students. Yet the doctrine of creation, rooted in the Old Testament and more fully ramified in the New Testament, provides the starting point for reflection on moral education. This paper is offered as a preliminary study of the subject. We will first analyze some of the general truths emerging out of the doctrine of creation, and how they incline us toward some acknowledgment of natural law. Second, we will discuss natural law ethical theory in contrast to major competitors. Third, we will show the relationship between traditional natural law theory and what has come to be called virtue ethics. Fourth, we will venture some suggestions for how natural law and virtue ethics enhance our understanding of the ethical component of liberal arts education. I. Unpacking the Conceptual Resources of the Judeo-Christian Doctrine of Creation 1 According to classic Christian thought about creation, God created a multitude of different beings with definite natures. Their natures involve their special characteristics, powers, and capacities. Whether vegetable or mineral, fish or foul-or even human-each thing just is the specific kind of thing it is. Each creature possesses its own unique nature, with structures and mechanisms that operate and develop over time. Historic orthodoxy affirms that human beings, with their unique natures, are made "in the image of God" (in imago Dei). This means that there is inherent dignity and worth in being human. While technical discussions abound regarding exactly what constitutes the image of God in persons, it is reasonable to think that the moral aspect of our nature reflects something of God's image. Thus, there is an ontological basis for ethics, a foundation in the very essence of personal reality. Theologically speaking, this ontological foundation in our own nature reflects something important in the very life of the divine being. The human Fall into sin did not destroy the image of God in created persons, but rather damaged and debilitated its abilities and capacities. As C. S. Lewis says, we are "bent" people. Or, as Claude Tresmontant writes: "What is altered is not human nature itself, but the relations, properly supernatural, between God and man."1 God's redemptive activity, then, is aimed not at replacing the image of God, but at restoring it to proper functioning. 2 Christian theology recognizes both the temporal and the eternal aspects of the divine redemptive program. However, while redemption offers to uplift and restore our fallen powers-including our moral powers-the groundwork for ethics is laid by creation. Another way of making this same point is to say that the classic Christian doctrines which bear on the reality of our redemption logically entail that a only a certain kind of being can be moral, have ethical transactions with its fellows, be addressed by God, know God's presence, and so forth. The doctrine of creation signifies that we human beings are this kind of creature. II. Natural Law Ethical Theory and Competing Ethical Theories The history of ethical theory is replete with theories of ethical obligation. In the modern period, two of the most influential theories are utilitarianism and Kantianism. Utilitarian ethics gauge the ethical rightness or wrongness of an action according to the beneficial consequences it has for the larger society. Its focus is on a particular objective dimension of moral deliberation and action-that is, whether certain outcomes are realized-quite apart from reference to a moral agent's private motives. The emerging thesis of J. S. Mill's classic essay On Liberty is that society, in its proper functioning as a corporate ethical reality, does not care what manner of person obeys social regulations-just so he obeys.2 While there is a great 3 insight contained in the principle that each person should be accorded the liberty to pursue the good as he or she understands it, utilitarian theories are still vulnerable to the criticism that what is supposedly beneficial to society is a value that can be arrived at independently of any knowledge of human nature and destiny. Furthermore, utilitarian theories tend to reduce what is good to what people in society perceive or think is good for them. Kantian ethics, by contrast to behavior-oriented utilitarian ethics, emphasizes the conformity of our will to the general form of moral law. In other words, the subjective side of morality must correlate with the objective side. This is a necessary condition for an act to be a truly moral one. Kant characterizes this motive as "respect for duty." For Kant, objective knowledge of moral duty is delivered by rational inspection of the general form of moral law. Viewed in the context of Kant's overall philosophy (as expressed in The Critique of Pure Reason), we see that Kant denied that we ever know the natures of things. We are left, then, with a highly rationalistic approach to the knowledge of moral obligation, a knowledge which supposedly can be acquired without knowledge of the nature of humanity itself! So, for all its opposition to utilitarian ethics, Kantianism falls prey to a similar criticism: such an ethical theory blindly proceeds without an investigation into the nature of humanity. A third type of theory that is introduced by some 4 religious thinkers seeks to ground ethical obligation in the commands of God. Divine command theories of ethics assert that an action (or a rule) is right because God commands it or wills it. While this theory involves certain important insights, and has a certain appeal to a religious mentality, it does not paint a complete picture of what makes an action morally right or wrong. Divine command ethics gives preeminence to the will of God, to divine volition, in establishing morality for the human race. What it typically fails to do is to account for the personal reality to which such commands are addressed, and thus is open to the charge that the divine will can arbitrarily establish morality. If the doctrine of creation is to instruct us at all at this point, it informs us that God created persons with a definite nature. Our given nature is to be rational-moral-social-physical beings which must behave and be treated in certain ways and not in other ways. For example, it is inherently wrong to defraud, murder, or steal from a being of this type. Not even God can change this fact. Here we see that the divine will cannot totally arbitrarily declare the shape of human morality. What God can will about human morality is constrained by the very kind of being we are-and this in light of the fact that God created the kind of being that we are. Given that we are this kind of being, certain moral considerations necessarily pertain to us.3 The essential weakness of divine command theory, then, is that it does not include any ontological 5 commitments about the kind of creature that persons are. Like utilitarianism and Kantianism, divine command theory, then, has no solid ontological base. The needed ontological base for ethics would include a consideration of our exact natures: it would be an account of the operations and laws of our unique nature, of how our capacities and potentials unfold, of what the end or purpose of life is. Thus, we would establish a theory dealing with what sorts of things are legitimate goods in human life, and of what genuine human happiness or fulfillment is. A more detailed, factual account of our actual natures would eventually reveal what definite structures and mechanisms are inherent in our moral nature such that we can cooperate with them to bring about desirable practical moral development. One key benefit of grounding ethics in a complete and realistic ontology of our natures is that ethics will then take on objective and universal status. It is objective because human nature is a reality independent of our choice; it is universal because human nature is everywhere the same. We have come, then, to the threshold of natural laws and virtues as we develop an adequate ethical theory. III. Natural Law and Virtue Ethics Traditionally, natural law ethical theory has been viewed as a significant alternative to utilitarian, Kantian, and divine command theories of ethics. Natural law ethics roots the ethical laws or rules that we ought to follow in 6 the structure of human nature. Since it is rooted in a complete theory of human nature, and human nature is created by God, many in the religious community (particularly the Roman Catholic and Anglican intellectual traditions) have favored natural law ethical theory over its competitors. However, in the past two decades, there has been a revival of discussions of "virtue ethics" as a serious alternative to all theories of ethics based on following rules or doing certain sorts of things. It is certainly true that much of modern ethical theory-as we have just discussed-relates ethics to what we do. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, attempts to recover a lost aspect of human morality-the inner aspect, what we are, or, better, what kind of person we are becoming. It is now fairly widely agreed that we needed this emphasis in contemporary exchanges on ethical theory. Yet the relationship between natural law theory and virtue ethics is not as neat and simple as some have thought. Instead of being two different theories of ethics that can stand independently, they are intimately linked. Properly understood, general natural law theory finds its appropriate expression in the moral realm in virtue ethics. Conversely, virtue ethics rests upon the metaphysical foundation of natural law theory. Classical natural law theory provides an account of what kind of being we are and how that kind of being should act and be treated. The norms or laws arising out of such an account are properly called 7 "natural laws." These laws govern what is morally right to do in the sphere of human action. However, a full-blown natural law theory includes an understanding of what kind of person we should endeavor to become, of what potential moral traits we should actualize over time, and of what the ultimate flourishing of human life is. In other words, what we are is as important as what we do, ethically speaking. And what we should endeavor to become-in terms of internal attitudes, habits, and dispositions-progresses from a discussion of the laws of our natures to the "virtues" that we can develop. So, a complete exploration of the conceptual resources of natural law ethical theory uncovers an interesting distinction between two important aspects of the moral dimension of human life. The intimate and important distinction between doing and being is critical for a complete and adequate ethical theory. One false stereotype of traditional natural law theory is that it, like many modern ethical theories, advocates behavioral conformity to general rules. Therefore, during the recent revival of discussions regarding virtue ethics,4 some thinkers have assumed that natural law ethics is a distinct and unrelated theory of ethics which stresses the inner or subjective side of morality. However, a full-blown conception of natural law ethics lends itself first to a discussion of our intrinsic nature and the laws of our nature, and then to a discussion of what natural lawful 8 tendencies and potentials we can develop in ethical living. This puts it in the same territory as virtue ethics. In effect, then, natural law ontology provides a basis for the discussion the nature and development of character and virtue. This discussion moreover can be placed within the larger context of a vision of the dignity and worth of human life, of what human flourishing truly is, and of the distinctively human telos. Even Kantian ethics, which recognizes the importance of motives in the subjective dimension of morality, lacks a comprehensive vision of human nature and its proper flourishing. Admittedly, the Kantian ethical vision postulates a "kingdom of ends" in which all of the seemingly diverse moral activities of people coalesce. However, this mere postulate reflects a certain type of "faith" that Kant recommends and falls far short of the metaphysical confidence that underlies natural law ethics and the attendant factual discussions within the natural law tradition of moral mechanisms in human life. Kant argues in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that acting "from duty" is the truly moral motive, whereas merely acting "in accordance with duty" is not morally relevant.5 We can use this distinction to draw some interesting conclusions. For example, what would it seem that Kant would say about a generally morally weak person who struggles subjectively with a particular moral decision and, against strong temptations, eventually conforms his 9 will to what is objectively right-because he respects what is right at that time. Would we not say that, for Kant, this act of the will based on the proper motive is of paramount importance? By contrast, the natural law theorist would say that the person whom Kant cites is morally immature-one who deserves a degree of credit for one good decision but hardly deserves recognition as a paradigm of mature, well-grounded moral action. Aware of the need to discipline and develop the capacities and potentials inherent in our nature, the natural law theorist contends that the paradigmatic morally mature person would not be characterized by continual struggles against strong temptations. As envisioned in traditional natural law theory (which, properly amplified, includes virtue ethics), the morally mature person has cultivated strong moral character. Having developed moral character, this person will relatively consistently tend to act and react morally in various situations over time-even in those situations which place strong temptations in his path. In other words, moral virtues are the operative expression of moral character. (It should be noted that this explication of lawfully developed moral character and its importance could be contrasted with Utilitarian Ethics and Divine Command Ethics just as we have contrasted it here with Kantian Ethics.) IV. Moral Development in the Context of a Liberal Arts Education 10 Assuming that the natural law theory and its corollary, virtue ethics, are sound, then we have many fecund ideas for how to situate moral development in the context of liberal arts education. (Indeed, traditional natural law theory in general provides fertile insights for all aspects of liberal arts education, but that is a topic for another paper.) As John Childs has stated, "Deliberate education is never morally neutral. A definite expression of preference for certain human ends, or values, is inherent in all efforts to guide the experience of the young."6 This thread of thought can be followed along a path that avoids the myth of value neutrality and the myth of the danger of repressive indoctrination. Of course, the old chestnut comes up at this point: Can virtue can be taught? This question, dating in Western philosophy to Socrates and Hippocrates, is an inveterate one. Without retracing all of the steps of this classic debate, suffice it to say that a holistically conceived educational experience must be concerned about moral development. If we broaden our concept of what it means to teach, then education can and should be designed to influence moral development in several basic ways. Early education can have a direct influence on moral growth by helping to shape the will, insisting on behavioral conformity to rules, and thus inculcating some desirable habits and dispositions. As the student grows older, however, more indirect influences become increasingly 11 important. One indirect influence that education can have on the moral life of students is by enlightening the mind. In the process of intellectual exchange and analysis, education can establish the rational conviction that certain principles are approvable and certain kinds of actions right. In addition to more overtly rational influence, which is itself indirect, the social environment can also be structured to provide indirect, positive influence on moral development. There are, of course, two extremes that must be avoided in structuring the social environment: legalism (excessive laws or rules) and antinomianism (excessive freedom). Between these two extremes, there is a moderate position that practical wisdom must discover. The ideal environment is characterized by a good measure of tolerance, love, and grace as well as a measure of structure appropriate to the maintenance of communal order. Striking such a balance will depend on exercising careful judgment about what is absolute and what is relative in moral life. This means that we must, on the one hand, be clear on the fundamental and enduring values of moral living and, on the other, understand the legitimate contingencies and variations of personal preference, fashion, and culture. The former can be prescribed and the latter simply cannot be prescribed without a negative, damaging effect to the overall effort to foster healthy moral development. The ultimate ideal in moral education is the 12 development of character and its attending virtues: for a person to become the kind of being who acts according to moral law out of a disposition to follow moral law. This leads to the proper flourishing of the moral aspect of human nature. Of course, what I have provided here is a highly general theoretical sketch of moral education in a liberal arts environment-a theoretical sketch informed by the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation and its implications for the natural and lawful development of our moral natures. Much more detailed and factual work remains to be done in order to design a positive, healthy, total educational environment. In recent years, Christian thinker Nicholas Wolterstorff has provided an admirable and helpful attempt to do just this.7 For example, we would need to consult the best psychological research about the ages and stages when young people can best learn certain moral concepts. We would need to know about the most effective methods for giving appropriate incentives for morally approvable behavior. We would need the wisdom of Solomon to know how much freedom to provide in the educational environment-even the freedom to make some moral mistakes. We would need to understand the importance of role models and exemplars in the educational environment, which helps us realize that "virtue is more caught than taught." Additionally, we would have to consider what content in each formal course of study might 13 be used as material for stimulating moral reflection. While this model of moral education in a liberal arts setting explores the significance of the doctrine of creation, we must not forget that another important area of exploration pertains to the doctrine of redemption. It would be the purpose of another paper to analyze how Christian themes of redemption offer a kind of completion to our model of moral education. That other study would explore the implications of sinfulness and fallenness for our natural moral mechanisms as well as the concepts of grace and forgiveness for uplifting moral life. Yet the express purpose of this paper has been to explore, if too briefly, how the doctrine of creation provides principal concepts for constructing an adequate theory of the nature of moral life and development, particularly within an educational setting. Notes 1Claude Tresmontant, Christian Metaphysics, trans. G. Slevin (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), p. 95. 2John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1986). 3As Aquinas, who is perhaps the preeminent theistic natural law thinker, says: "The natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law." See Summa Theologica, Second Article. 4See the brief bibliography here which includes works 14 reflecting the revival of virtue ethics in our day. 5Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), First Section. 6John Childs, Education and Morals (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 17. 7Nicholas Wolterstorff, Educating for Responsible Action (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980). A Brief Bibliography of Works on Natural Law, Character, and Virtue of Interest to Christian Educators Dykstra, Craig. Vision and Character: A Christian Alternative to Kohlberg. New York: Paulist Press, 1981. Hauerwas, Stanley. Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974. Kruswich, Robert, and Roberts, Robert, eds. The Virtues: Contemporary Essays on Moral Character. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1987. Lewis, C. S. The Abolition of Man. New York: Macmillian, 1955. MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981; 2nd ed., 1984. Meilaender, Gilbert. The Theory and Practice of Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. O'Donnovan, Oliver. Resurrection and Moral Order. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986. Peterson, Michael. Philosophy of Education: Issues and Options. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986. Chs. 4 & 6. Peterson, Michael, et al. Reason and Religious Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Ch. 13 on "Religious Ethics." Veatch, Henry. For an Ontology of Morals. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1971. ________. Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. 15 Nicholas Wolterstorff. Educating for Responsible Action. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980. 16